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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
SURGICAL SUPPLY CENTER, INC. 
a corporation; PROFESSIONAL 
PHARMACY, INC. a corporation, 
et al. 
Plaintiffs and Petitioners, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, THE DEPARTMENT OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT OF THE 
SECTION OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, et al. 
Defendants. 
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7390 
From December 30, 1938, to January 3, 1944, plain-
tiff, James F. Robinson, was engaged in the pharmacy 
business as a sole proprietorship under the name of Pro-
fessional Pharmacy. About November 23, 1942, Robinson 
purchased from James W. Reeve, a surgical supply busi-
ness which he then operated as a sole proprietorship under 
the name of Surgical Supply Center. The pharmacy 
business and the surgical supply business retained their 
separate identities and locations. Robinson continued as 
manager of the pharmacy, and plaintiff, E. Wilford 
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Brown, an old employee at the surgical supply remained 
as manager of that business. Being war years and the 
governmental agencies were anxious for immediate de-
livery of hospital and surgical supplies, and capable em-
ployees being difficult to obtain, Robinson was under the 
necessity of devoting a considerable part of his time to 
the surgical supply division of his business; and plaintiff, 
Angus E. Ossman, was employed as auditor in charge of 
the finances of both businesses. The nature of the busi-
nesses were so distinct that it would have been impossible 
to successfully combine them. They were operated sep-
arately, each with its own separate personnel, trade 
names, accounts, and locations; except that Robinson and 
Ossman devoted variable time to each business. To avoid 
misunderstanding between his two principal employees 
and simplify the keeping of books as to the pay of Robin-
son and Ossman, a single partnership was organized on 
January 3, 1944, consisting of Robinson, Brown and Oss-
man, which took over both businesses. However, separate 
accounts were maintained for each business, and the ex-
perience rating is based upon the actual experience rela-
tion of employees to each business. 
On October 1, 194 7, for practical reasons which had 
no relationship to or connection with the matter of un-
employment compensation or taxes therefore, two corpor-
ations were formed,-one, Surgical Supply Center, Inc. 
taking over the surgical supply business and its assets, and 
the other, Professional Pharmacy, Inc., taking over the 
pharmacy business and its assets. This involved no diffi-
culty as the businesses, books, records, charges and ac-
counts had always been kept separate and distinct. Since 
that time the employees, which under the partnership had 
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been employed by each business, has continued so em-
ployed in the same business and positions under the two 
corporations. The two corporations were and are owned 
by the partnership, except five shares, one each by 
Robinson, Brown and Ossman, who had been and are the 
three partners, and one by each of two qualifying stock-
holders. 
The experience rating of each of the businesses was 
such that a reduced rate of contribution, to wit, .07%, was 
in order. On May 14, 1948, defendant, Utah Depart-
ment of Employment Security, notified the corporate 
plaintiffs that beginning as of October 1, 1947, their con-
tribution rate would be 2.7%, the rate fixed by statute 
for an employer with no experience rating. (That is the 
highest rate allowed by statute.) Upon appeal, the Appeals 
Referee upheld the rate fixed by the department. The 
gist of the decision of the Referee is stated in two para-
graphs of his decision as follows : 
"If it could be found that there existed two separate 
partnerships which each transferred its assets to a 
separate corporation and then discontinued opera-
tions, then the new corporations would clearly be 
entitled to inherited status for the purpose of deter-
mination of contribution rate in this case. However, 
the facts clearly show that the new corporations 
that came into being on October 1, 1948 had a 
common predecessor, the single partnership which 
owned and operated the two separate businesses, 
and neither of the successors acquired all or sub-
stantially all of the assets of this predecessor as . 
required by the law to qualify for inherited status. 
Appellants urge the contention that the corpora-
tions are successors to two individual businesses 
which were maintained separate and distinct by 
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the partnership but this is not sufficient inasmuch 
as the businesses were merely separate units of the 
single legal entity and were not separate entities 
liable under the law in their own right but were 
jointly liable as a partnership."· 
The Board of Review affirmed, and this action 
brings the matter here for determination. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS OF THE DEPART-
MENT UPON WHICH PLAINTIFF RELIES AND 
ASSIGN FOR REVERSAL AND VACATION OF 
ORDER WITH RESPECT TO RATES OF CONTRI-
BUTION TO BE PAID BY PLAINTIFF CORPORA-
TIONS. 
1. The department erred in its interpretation and 
application of the law in holding corporate plaintiffs 
were not "qualified employers" for determining rates of 
contribution. 
2. The department erred in holding the corporate 
plaintiffs had not acquired substantially all of the assets 
of the employer, for the purpose of becoming a "qualified 
employer" under the Act. 
We contend that under the factual situation as it 
exists in this case, and as shown and conceded by the 
record, the two plaintiff corporations are successors to 
two individual businesses, which were and always had 
been maintained separate and distinct, although they had 
both been owned and operated by the same partnership. 
In other words we maintain: That for the purposes of 
the application of Chapter 56, Laws of Utah, 1947, and 
particularly of Section 42-2a-7- thereof, under subdivision 
C of that Section, the sale and transfer of the Surgical 
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Supply business to Surgical Supply, Inc., and the sale and 
transfer of the Professional Pharmacy business to the Pro-
fessional Pharmacy, Inc., in each case was in effect the 
sale of all or substantially all of the assets of another em-
ployer, who, upon such acquisition, discontinued opera-
tion; that the new employers were thereupon entitled to 
an "inherited status" as employers, and were "qualified 
employers" for the purpose of determining contribution 
liability, and entitled to reduced rates. 
Section 42-2a-7, referred to as far as material to this 
point, by subhead C of subdivision (c) provides that a 
"qualified employer" (one entitled to reduced rates, based 
upon experience rating) is one who was an employer for 
thirteen consecutive calendar quarters, and for the three 
years had filed all reports and paid all contributions re-
quired. It then adds : 
"If an employer has acquired all or substantially 
all of the assets of another employer and such other 
employer had discontinued operations upon such 
acquisition, the period of liability of both employ-
ers during such period shall be jointly considered 
for all purposes of this section. (That is for the 
purposes of classification and determining contri-
bution rates.') 
The Department of Unemployment Security and the 
Appeals Referee held that plaintiffs, Surgical Supply 
Center, Inc., and Professional Pharmacy, Inc., were both 
new employers, and since Surgical Supply, Inc., had ac~ 
quired only the surgical supply business, operated at 331 
South Main Street, and the Professional Pharmacy, Inc. 
had acquired only the pharmacy business operated in the 
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Judge Building, neither of the new employers had ac-
quired all the assets of the partnership, and were there-
fore not entitled to the benefit of the experience rating 
of the partnership. 
STATEMENT AND ARGUMENT ON POINTS OF 
ERRORS. 
1-2. Under proper construction of the law, plaintiff 
corporations are qualified employers. 
We contend such holding is in error, and is a mis-
construction, misinterpretation and misapplication, of 
the law. We maintain that the true and correct inter-
pretation and construction of law is: that if an employer 
acquire substantially all of the assets of the business which 
he acquires, and the other employer discontinues opera-
tion in that field or line of business, the period of liability 
of both employers shall be jointly considered. Essentially 
the question is whether the statute is to have a critical, 
super technical interpretation, or an interpretation in line 
with the purposes, plan, and general purport of the Act. 
If the words of the statute, without regard to purpose and 
practical application, is to be the measure, then it is not 
necessary that the acquiring employer obtain, take over, 
or acquire the business, trade, organization, or enterprise 
of the former employer. The statute says: "acquired 
substantially all of the assets of another employer;" not of 
the enterprise or business. There are many things that 
are assets of a business, that are not assets of the owner 
apart from the business, like "good will" which is inherent 
in the business and cannot be sold apart from it. Utah 
Idaho Sugar Co., vs. Salt Lake County, 60 Utah, 491,512, 
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210 Pac. 106, 27 A.L.R. 84 7; 24 Am. J ur. 804, 5; Anno. 
An.Cas. 1914 B, 874. There are many things that are 
assets of the owner that have no connection with the busi-
ness. Thus stockholders statutory liability to a bank is not 
a bank asset of the bank and cannot be sold under an 
order for a sale of assets. Andrews vs. Bank of Swea City, 
242 N.W. 62, 65; Deareso vs. Mobley, 38 Ga. App. 313, 
154 S.E. 915, 920; Private letters Re Ryans Estate 188 
N.Y.S. 387; a homestead right; an exemption from exe-
cution, and many others. 
The Supreme Court of Connecticut in Harris vs. 
Egan, 135 Conn. 102, 60 A (2) 922, 4 A.L.R. (2) 717, 
held that organization, trade, business, and assets were 
separate and distinct things, and one did not include the 
other. Thus most statutes read "acquires the organization, 
trade, business, or substantially all of the assets of an-
other employer. California Statutes 1937, pp 2053, 4, 
paragraphs 9 (a) and (b) ; Code of Iowa 1946, Section 
96.19; so also Massachusetts, Washington, Colorado, Ten-
nessee and many others. 
Methinks defendants will say that "employer" means 
the business and not the owner. With that we have no 
quarrel, but that calls for· a liberal construction to fit the 
sense and purpose of the statute, and not the words. So 
to, "word interpretation" would provide trouble with 
"employer," "operations" and "jointly considered." 
Let us view the sentence in question in the light of 
the purpose, plan, and purport of the Act; in the light of 
the things and object sought to be accomplished by it; 
what it sought to allow and what it sought to prevent. 
Speaking of the meaning of terms and sentences in our 
social legislation which enters new fields under new con-
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cepts, the Supreme Court of the United States, speaking 
through Justice Rutledge in National Labor Relations 
Board vs. Hearst Publications Inc., 322 U. S. 111, 64 Sup. 
Ct. 851, 88 L.Ed. 1170, says they are to be interpreted not 
through legal classifications and common law standards 
'but with regard to the history, context, and purpose of the 
Act, and to the economic facts of the particular relation-
ship." The United States Court of Appeals, D. C. in 
Grace vs. Mcgruder, 148 Fed. 121, 679, says the social 
security act is primarily remedial and "requires construc-
tion which will give effect to the legislative intention in 
the light of the mischief to be correctedJ and end to be ob-
tainedJ and the taxing phase is secondary and incidental." 
The primary purpose of construing a statute, the purpose 
to which others must yield, is to arrive at the legislative 
intent and render that intent effective. Such intent must 
be deduced from the entire statute and every part of it 
taken and construed together. One portion of an act is 
often designed to extend, qualify, or limit or give meaning 
to another provision. 2 Sutherland Stat. Canst. Section 
368. Each part or section should be construed in connec-
tion with every other part or section. Inter-State Water 
Co. v City of Danville, 379 Ill. 41, 39 N.E. ( 2) ----------------· 
Not only the language but the evils to be limited and the 
objects to be obtained must be considered. If it admits 
of two constructions, one of which renders it reason-
able and salutary in the light of the objects to be achieved 
and the other renders it unreasonable or mischievous, if 
not absurd, the latter should be avoided. Inter-State 
Water v Danville supra; Burke v Ind. Com. 368 Ill. 544, 
15 N. E. ( 2) 305. So, a situation within the object spirit 
and meaning of a statute is regarded within the statute; 
a situation within the letter is without the statute unless 
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it is also within the intent. Burke v Ind. Com. supra; U.S. 
Ind. Alcohol v Nudelman, 375 Ill. 342, 31 N.E. (2) 594. 
Considering the statute in question from this position 
we have here an enactment which manifests a legislative 
intent that technical legal definitions are not applicable 
to cases under this statute. Thus the \Vord "employing 
unit" expresses legislative intent to deal with realities by 
taking notice of economic and business considerations. 
"Employer" is defined in terms of an "employing unit", 
both of which with "employee", "wages", "surplus", and 
many others differ from the usually accepted connotations 
and common law concepts of these terms. Such terms and 
many others are not used as word of restricted meanings, 
and have no precise or rigid definitions, meaning or use. 
The lexicon of the Act is in general descriptions, broad 
terms, elastic meanings, uses and applications, evidencing 
a legislative intent to brush aside or leap over legal bar-
riers, and secure an interpretation and application of the 
Act based upon economic and business sense, and not upon 
rigid, common law or tax rule construction. See Unem-
ployment Compensation Commission vs. Jefferson Life 
215 N.C. 479; 2 S.E. (2) 584; Lindley vs. Murphy, 387 
Ill .. 506, 56 N.E. (2) 832; Peasley vs. Murphy, 386 Ill. 
258, 53 N.E. (2') 944; 143 A.L.R. 414; Godsol vs. Un-
employment Compensation Commission, 302 Mich. 652, 
5 N.W. (2) 519, 142 A.L.R. 910. This Court has in effect 
taken the same view in a number of cases. See opinions 
of Justice Wolfe in National Tunnel and Mines vs. Indus-
trial Commission, ________ Utah ____________ , 102 Pac. ( 2) 508; 
of Chief Justice Pratt and of Justice McDonough in Lo-
gan Cache Knitting vs. Industrial Commission -------- U t. 
________ , 102 Pac. ( 2) 495. Bear in mind that the Depart-
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ment was required from the beginning to keep an ex-
perience rating on each business or employer; that the Act 
provided that employers or businesses, after three years of 
paying were entitled to have their rates adjusted, guided 
by the calls on the fund that had been made by employees 
of the employer because they were for a time unemployed. 
Since the Act was to stabilize employment, the employer 
was to be encouraged to maintain payroll stability, by re-
ducing his rate of contributions as he kept- his employees 
on the roll so they would not make calls on the fund. 
Paragraph ( 5) of Section 42-2a-7 describes "Em-
ployer" under certain conditions so as to include several 
employing units and to include two or more corporate 
entities, if owned or controlled by the same interests. The 
Legislature here made it abundantly clear that one em-
ployer may have several enterprises or employing units 
and that all his enterprises are to be considered as one only 
for purposes of bringing the employees within the Act, 
but otherwise are to be considered as separate "employ-
ing units." Referring to "a form of reorganization affect-
ing a change in legal identity or form "of an employing 
unit reads: "(A) immediately after such change the em-
ploying ENTERPRISES of the predecessor employing 
UNIT" (caps ours) reorganizing that enterprises or units 
which economically or in reality constitute separate em-
ploying units shall be so considered, and enterprises or 
units which economically or in reality constitute but a 
single business shall be deemed a single business, familiar 
rules of corporation law, partnership law, and the law of 
master and servant to the contrary notwithstanding. The 
case of Karlson vs. Murphy-Commissioner, 383 Ill. 436, 
56 N.E. ( 2) 839, a brokerage business had passed through 
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seven different partnerships. The Court on p. 442 of the 
Illinois report says: "If each successive partnership be 
considered as a separate and independent employer, plain-
tiffs are, of course, not entitled to the refunds awarded 
them. If on the other hand, the terms "employer" and 
"employing unit" employed in the statute, are construed 
in an economic rather than in a technical legal sense, they 
are entitled to the relief afforded them." After a rather 
lengthy discussion of the terms the court goes on: "This 
group of seven partnerships transacted business, and for 
all practical purposes, so far as the public, the State, credi-
tors, customers, and its employ~es were concerned, was 
the same business unit." Again the court says: "The af-
filiation clause, the successor clauses, and the inherited 
rating experience clause, fortify our conclusion that the 
words "employing unit" are used in an economic and busi-
ness sense. There clauses deal with matters of substance 
rather than form. * * * * * manifestly the General As-
sembly did not intend the meaning of the words "employ-
ing unit" to be dependent upon the legal form of the 
economic or business unit for whom the employee renders 
service." and holds that the seven successive partner-
ships are to be considered and treated as one. 
Meyer vs. Mich. Unemployment Comp. Com. 311 
Mich. 440, 18 N.W. (2) 886, was a case where partner-
ship succeeded to the business of Meyer, who became one 
of the partners. The commission held this to be a new 
employer. The court on page 887 of the Reporter says: 
"Contribution by an employer is required for the purpose 
of compensating for losses to the employees by reason of 
unemployment. The rate of such contribution is, within 
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limits, made to depend on the history of the enterprise 
for unemployment which history is called the experience 
record. The rate thus determined is called the experience 
index, that is the rate indica ted by experience as being 
necessary. The experience index of any particular enter-
prise is to be computed as provided in Section 18 (c) of 
the Act."- After referring with approval to Karlson vs. 
Murphy, supra, where six successive partnerships were 
treated as one em player, the court says : "We consider 
the section in question should be construed with reference 
to the words as used in their economic sense rather than 
as strict legal phraseology.'' 
"The words in question "that employing unit" refers 
to unity of enterprise and not to unity of ownership or 
management. It is the matter of employment of the same 
enterprise." The court then concludes that in considera-
tion of the whole act the partnership was entitled the 
benefits of position of the predecessor in determining what 
it was to pay. (Italics added) 
Certainly in an economic sense, in a business sense, 
in a sense of the practical ways of practical men, the 
sentence under consideration in this action would be 
thought and held to mean that when a person buys a busi-
ness from another with substantially all the assets of the 
business he has taken over, the seller quitting such business 
or operation, the buyer is entitled to the benefit of the ex-
perience rating established by the business he takes over. 
Some businesses are periodic and fluctuating in the num-
ber of employees seasonally or otherwose; others keep an 
almost constant roll. This is largely due to the nature of 
the business. The spirit and purpose of the act is to make 
each business, trade, or undertaking which has employees, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
bear the burden of the unemployment that results at t~mes 
from its operation. It is not contemplated that one busi-
ness which keeps a constant payroll shall carry the burdens 
for one which fluctuates. That is the purpose of Section 
42-2A-7 providing for rate changes based on experience. 
Let us take an example: "A" is an employer. He 
operates a hotel in Logan; a fair size grocery store in Salt 
Lake; a lumber yard in Salina; and a sheep ranch at 
Vernal. At each place he qualifies as an employer, with 
an excellent experience rating at each establishment. He 
sells the lumber yard at Salina to one operating a yard at 
Richfield which also has a good rating. Under the con-
tention of the department before the new owner could get 
the benefit of the experience rating he must needs buy the 
hotel, the grocery store and the sheep ranch. Is that sense 
or sound in law, or in economics, or business, or practical 
thinking in practical life? Yea, they go further: Their 
position must be that if a man owns and operates a busi-
ness, being an employer, and then incorporates himself as 
a corporation sole, to go on with the same business, his 
experience rating of .07% must be raised to 2. 7% for three 
years. And that under a law designed to give each business 
establishment the lowest possible rate based upon his pay-
roll turnover. Alas, poor Yorick, I knew him well. P. H. 
Vartanian, the annotator, on page 724 of 4 A.L.R. (2), 
thus summarizes the transfer section of Social Security 
Acts says: "The purpose of such provisions was to place 
the purchaser of a business conducted by one who was an 
employer under the law in the shoes of the seller of the 
business, so that the purchaser would, in effect, be the 
same employer as the seller had theretofore, and would 
be entitled to any benefits accruing to the seller at the time 
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the sale was made, and liable for any payments thereafter 
for which the seller would have been liable had the seller 
continued to operate the business; and that in such case 
the purchaser in effect became the employer in the place 
and stead of the former employer." (Italics ours) 
The Connecticut Court, in Harris vs. Egan, 135 
Conn. 102, 60 A ( 2) 922, 4 A.L.R. ( 2) 717, says: "The 
theory obviously is that the business is to be treated as a 
single continuing employment," and again they say: 
"In applying the statute, a prime question in de-
termining whether' substantially all of the assets, 
-the organization or the trade or business was taken 
over is: Did the acquisition result in a substantial 
continuation of the same or a like business." 
In the instant case it resulted in a perfect, complete con-
tinuation of exactly the same business without any changes 
in control, ownership, accounts, keeping of books, person-
nel, line of stock, obligations or anything except the tech-
nical legal name of the employer. 
As to what constitutes substantially all of the stock, 
or property or assets, is a matter for the court to construe 
and determine. In re: Temtor Corn vs. Fruit Products 
Co. 299 Fed. 326, 31; U.S. vs. Whyel 10 Fed. (2) 260. 
Rules or guides to determine the construction or applica-
tion of the phrase are indicated in the Temtor case at 
pages 328, 9; Lindley vs. Murphy 387 Ill. 506, 56 N.E. 
(2') 832, 4. The term "substantially all' is elastic and 
must be construed with relationship to its purpose. Log-
lici vs. Liquor Commission 123 Conn. 31, 192 A. 260, 2. 
The meaning of this statute must be determined from 
its purpose. The taxing element is secondary and inciden-
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tal. Natl. Rei. Bd. vs. Hearst 332 U.S. 111, 64 Sup. Ct. 
851, 88 L.ed 1170; Grace vs. McGruder Supra; Cohn vs. 
District Unemployment Comp. Bd. 167 Fed. (2) 883. 
Further reasons why corporate plaintiffs should be 
held to be Qualified Employers. 
Our next point is that the plaintiff corporations are 
not new employers; that they do not come within the term 
of "an employer who acquired the assets of another em-
ployer." They are in truth, in effect, and within the spirit 
and purpose of the statute the same employer~ having 
merely affected a change in legal identity or form. The 
partnership owns all of the outstanding capital stock of 
the corporations except the qualifying shares. No new 
parties can come in except by buying out the interest of 
one of the others, the same as in the partnership. In fact 
the partnership just changed the legal identity or name 
under which the two employing units are operated. Such 
change is not, under the statute, considered a change in 
employer, or a transfer from one employer to another. 
And the statute expressly provides that "effective as of 
the date of such change in legal identity or form, the com-
mission shall for the purposes of rate determinationJ trans-
fer to the successor the payroll record and experience 
rating record of the predecessor," and the contribution 
rate shall be determined from the experience record. 
Paragraph 5 of Section 42-2A-7 Laws of Utah, 1947. 
We have no doubt the department will say that we 
do not come within this paragraph, and so we present an 
analysis of the section. As far as material here it reads: 
"For the purpose of this subsection two or more 
employing units which are parties to ****** a 
form of reorganization effecting a change in legal 
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identity or form shall be deemed to be a single 
employing unit if (A) immediately after such 
change the employing enterprises of the prede-
cessor employing unit or units are continued solely 
through a single employing unit as successor there-
to, and (B) immediately after such change such 
successor is owned or controlled by substantially 
the same interests as the predecessor employing 
unit or units." 
The cases indicate that the requirements of such a pro-
vision is met by one employing unit changing its form or 
legal identity into another form or legal identity, by re-
organizing itself if the reorganized unit meets the require-
ments of (A) and ( B ) . 
In Maine Unemployment Comp. Com. vs. Andros-
coggin 137 Me. 154, 16 A (2), 252 the court quotes a 
pertinent statement from Chicago, M. & S. P. RR Co. 
vs. Minneapolis C. & C. Assn., 247 U.S. 490, 501, 38 S. 
Ct. 553, page 557, 62 L. Ed 1229, as follows: "In such 
a case the courts will not permit themselves to be blinded 
, or deceived by the mere forms of law but, regardless of 
fictions, will deal with the substance of the transaction 
involved as if the corporate agency did not exist and as 
the justice of the case may require." 
In Unemp. Comp. Com. vs. City Ice and Coal, 216 
N.C. 6, 3 S.E. (2) 290, the court says on page 292: "It 
regards corporate organizations objectively and realistic-
ally, unencumbered by the fictions of corporate identity, 
and thus brushing aside forms, deals with substance." 
Godsol vs. Mich. Unemp. Comp. Co., 302 Mich. 652, 5 
N.W. (2') 519, 142 A.L.R. 910; Meyer vs. Mich. Unemp. 
Comp. Comm., supra; C. T. Investment Co. vs. Commis-
sion, 88 Fed. (2) 582. 
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Here the surgical supply business, as an employing 
enterprise of the partnership is continued through a single 
employing unit as successor thereto; so also is the phar-
macy business as an employing enterprise. So as to (B); 
immediately after such change (and continuing to the 
present moment) the very same unit, the partnership owns 
and controls the successor employing units. We call at-
tention to the language of the section, "THE EMPLOY-
ING ENTERPRISES OF THE EMPLOYING UNIT," 
clearly recognizing that an employing unit may have and 
operate several "employing enterprises," which is exactly 
what the partnership in· this action did and is still doing-
an employing enterprise in the Surgical Supply, and an 
employing enterprise in the Professional Pharmacy as con-
tended for by us under subdivision (C) of part ( 2) of the 
section discussed supra. This section also shows that the 
legislature did not intend that employer should lose his 
experience rating by changing his legal form. After pro-
viding that an employing unit may change its legal 
identity or form as long as the new unit was owned or con-
trolled by the same interest as before the change in form 
or legal identity the section provides: "Effective as of 
the date of such change in legal identity or form, the com-
mission shall for purposes of rate determination transfer 
to the successor the payroll record and experience rating 
record of the predecessor." 
It would seem that the Legislature intended that 
each separate enterprise of an employer is to be considered 
as a separate employing unit, except for the purpose of 
including within the protection of the Act, employees of 
such an enterprise which, for lack of numbers, would not 
be covered into the Act. In such case the several employ-
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ing enterprises of one employer, are for the purpose of 
bringing all employees within the Act, considered as one. 
The reason universally assigned for this joining affiliate 
"employing units" for coverage purposes is to prevent 
shifting of employees or pay charges where there is unity 
of control. Re: Temtor Corn vs. Fruits Products, 299 
Fed. 326, 9; Karlson vs. Murphy, supra; Lindley vs. 
Murphy, supra. 
That the Legislature intended that the Surgical Sup-
ply business and the Pharmacy business, when taken over 
by the corporations, were to be treated as two separate 
units for contribution purposes is evidenced by the further 
fact that after the decision of the Department in cases 
such as these the L.egislature in 1949, made the matter 
definite and beyond further question, when they declared, 
That when an employer who acquires substantially all, 
or a clearly segregable or identifiable part of another em-
ployer's enterprise, the past experience rating of the enter-
prise sh.all go to the benefit of acquiring employer. Laws 
of Utah 1949, Chapter 53, page 118. See Arado vs. Keitel 
353 Mo. 223, 182 S.W. (2) 176; Lindley vs. Murphy, 387 
Ill. 506, 56 N.E. (2) 832, 4; Billet vs. Gordon, 389 Ill. 
454, 59 N.E. (2) 812; Meyer vs. Mich. Unemployment 
Comp. 311 Mich. 440 18 N.W. (2) 1886. 
We summarize the points and discussion: 
The corporate plaintiffs are "Qualified employers" 
because: 
1. They acquired substantially all of the assets of the 
enterprise of "employing units" they acquired. 
2. For the purposes of the section here involved, enter-
prises which are in their nature and operation separate 
are considered as separate businesses, or "employing as-
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sets" for purposes of determining contribution rates upon 
transfer. 
3. Since the corporate plaintiffs, the acquiring em-
ployers are owned and controlled by the partnership, the 
former employing unit, the department erred in law in 
holding that the corporate plaintiffs were new or acquir-
ing employers in the matter of determining rates of con-
tribution. 
4. The organization of the corporate plaintiffs was, un-
der Section 42-2a-7, just a change of identity or form 
under part ( 5) of the section and therefore entitled again 
to inherited status for determination of rate of contribu-
tion. 
Under a proper construction and interpretation of 
the statute, the facts show that for the purpose of Section 
42-2a-7 -, the corporate plaintiffs are the same employer 
as the partnership and therefore is a "qualified Employer" 
and entitled to a reduced rate_ of contribution under their 
experience rating index. 
We respectfully submitted that the Order of the 
Department of Unemployment Security and the Appeal 
Referee holding the plaintiff corporations 'vere not Quali-
fied Employers, and fixing their rate of contribution at 
2.7% is against the law, is null and void and should be 
vacated, annulled and set aside. 
Respectfully submitted 
Owen G. Reichman 
Martin M~ Larson 
Attorneys for plaintiffs 
Received copy this ____________ day of November, 1949. 
Attorney for defendants. 
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